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Abstract
Purpose The paper addresses a transport market consisting of
two firms with goals extending beyond pure profit
maximisation. Considering that transport companies often
have public owners and that managers have different objective
that the owners, it is argued the firms maximise a weighted
sum of profits, revenues and total consumer surplus.
Methods The paper analyses equilibrium fares and quantities
arising from collusion and competition on price (Bertrand) and
quantity (Cournot), when the firms produce symmetrically dif-
ferentiable services and have identical cost and goal functions.
Results Special focus is given to analyzing how the firms’
costs, the degree of substitutability and complementarity be-
tween their services and their goal functions influence equi-
librium prices in the three different competitive situations. The
influence of parameters included in the model regarding the
differences between the equilibrium prices is also addressed.
Conclusions The study provides relevant knowledge for trans-
port authorities of how transport firms respond to changes in
competitive regimes depending on their objectives and com-
petitive situation.
Keywords Collusion . Equilibrium prices . Goal functions .
Passenger transport . Price competition .Quantity competition
1 Introduction
It is well recognized that the design of optimal fares for
transport firms depends on the goals that are to be
maximised, e.g. [1]. Various recent studies have, for
example, focused on how fares are set in firms
maximising a weighted sum of profits and consumer
surplus, see [2, 3] and [4]. However, firms and transport
authorities may also maximize other goals than profit
and consumer surplus (e.g. [5, 6]). [5] discusses mixed
goal functions and deduces the conditions for optimal
fares and vehicle-km supplied by bus companies want-
ing to maximise social surplus, passenger-km or
vehicle-km subject to a budget constraint.
It has been argued that private transport operators
may not purely maximise profit. This is, according to
[3] and [7], mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, at least
in Scandinavia, local businesses, local authorities and
states own substantial equity interests in the transport
companies.1 All these groups of owners concern them-
selves with the standard of public transport. Local busi-
nesses in the license area of the company are interested
in good public transport so that customers gain easy
access to their facilities. Local authorities holding shares
in transport companies operating locally are also con-
cerned about the transport quality they offer, because
good transport is important for the inhabitants’
wellbeing, and therefore for the development of the
community. These arguments are also relevant for the
state as an owner and support the inclusion of consumer
surplus in the goal function.
The second reason why firms could pursue other goals than
profit is the separation of ownership and leadership. This
1 In Norway, for example, public bodies held in 2004 the majority of
shares in 36 of the 95 bus companies [21] and the states of Norway,
Sweden and Denmark held, respectively, 14 %, 21 % and 14 % of the
shares in the dominant air carrier (SAS). There are also various degrees of
public ownership in air and rail companies in many European countries
[14].
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implies that managers (agents) may have other goals
than the owners (principals) and also some power to
pursue them. Managers working and living in the trans-
port firms’ operating areas are naturally interested in
keeping popular amongst the inhabitants by offering
good quality public transport; i.e. they place weight on
the consumers’ wellbeing. Moreover, they may in par-
ticular be interested in running a big company since
their salaries and status are often positively related to
the firms’ size; for example measured in terms of the
firms’ revenues. The relevance of the leaders’ power
and interests on the firms’ goal functions and their
subsequently influences on prices and quantities sup-
plied have been addressed previously by [8–13]. These
managerial discretion models are, thus, also relevant as
far as transport firms are concerned [1].
Bearing the above arguments in mind, the aim of this
paper is to expand the scope of the analysis provided
by [4] by incorporating revenue in the transport firms’
goal functions in addition to the profit and consumer
surplus included in the original model. Transport oper-
ators maximise, thus, a weighted sum of profits, reve-
nues and consumer surplus. In accordance with [4] we
focus on the cases in which two firms compete simul-
taneously with regard to quantity (Cournot) and price
(Bertrand) and when they collude. Even though the
liberalization of the transport markets in industrialized
countries has increased competition,2 many transport
routes are still served by one or two suppliers, at least
when it comes to passenger transport (e.g. [14–17]).
One or two suppliers are commonplace on many routes
in both bus and air transport and in the UK most trains
are served by one or two companies. Moreover, since
passengers often make use of more the one company to
complete a trip, the same companies may produce both
substitutable and complementary services. Hence, the
model takes into account a specific feature of the trans-
port market that the infrastructure, e.g. airports and
roads, are provided by the government and that trans-
port firms provide scheduled routes on a commercial
basis.
The aim of this paper is to derive equilibrium prices
and quantities and discuss how the prices are influenced
by 1) the weights firms place on profits, revenues and
consumer surplus; 2) their competitive situation; 3) the
degree of substitutability or complementarity between
the services they offer and, finally; 4) their costs.
Specific attention is also given to analysing the combi-
nations of weight put on revenue and consumer surplus
resulting in equal equilibrium fares. This knowledge can
help regulators aiming to meet politically decided ob-
jectives through regulation.
The further organization of the paper is: in Section 2 the
model with equilibrium prices and quantities are presented.
Then, Section 3 takes the analysis further by conducting
comparative analyses of the different equilibrium prices. Fi-
nally, implications specifically aimed at regulators are sug-
gested in Section 4.
2 Market solutions
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Demand and cost conditions
Let us assume a transport market operated by two firms able to
set fares and quantity freely. Following the model originally
developed by [18] and later applied by [4] for the transport
markets, it is assumed that a representative passenger has the
following utility function, based on the use of the two services
X1 and X2
U X 1;X 2ð Þ ¼ X 1 þ X 2−X
2
1 þ X 22 þ 2sX 1X 2
2
ð1Þ
in which s denotes the degree of substitutability or comple-
mentarity between the two services. If s = 1 and s = − 1 then
the services are perfect substitutes and perfect complements,
respectively. A value of s =0 represents the case of indepen-
dent markets. Consequently, this parameter indicates the de-
gree of competition between the firms in any specific market
situation. In the following analyses it is assumed that the
parameter value for s is restricted to −1<s <1.
By maximisation of the passenger’s consumer surplus
S ¼ U X 1;X 2ð Þ−∑2i¼1PiX i
 
the symmetric inverse demand
functions are given by:
P1 ¼ 1−X 1−sX 2 and P2 ¼ 1−X 2−sX 1 ð2Þ
where Pi represents the price for firm i ={1,2}. Assume, for
example, that the demands for transport services provided by
firms 1 and 2 in equilibrium are represented by X1
* and X2
*,
respectively. Using Eqs. (1) and (2) in combination with
U X 1;X 2ð Þ−∑2i¼1PiX i
 
gives the following expression for
passengers’ total consumer surplus (S )
S ¼ X
2
1 þ X 22 þ 2sX 1X 2
2
ð3Þ
2 In air transport, this trend started with the Air Deregulation Act of 1978
in the US and with the three liberalization packages between 1988 and
1997 in Europe [22].
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The firms are assumed to have the following identical cost
functions3:
Ci X ið Þ ¼ cX i where 0 < c < 1 ð4Þ
The above functions lead to the following profit expres-
sions, π i (pi), for the firms:
π1 ¼ 1−X 1−sX 2ð ÞX 1−cX 1 and π2 ¼ 1−X 2−sX 1ð ÞX 2−cX 2
ð5Þ
2.1.2 The firms’ goal functions
Following the argument that goals are influenced by owner-
ship structure and the power of leadership, firms’ are assumed
to maximise the following weighted sum, Gi, of profits,
revenues and total passengers’ surplus of which all are mea-
sured in pecuniary terms
Gi ¼ πi þ β PiX ið Þ þ γS where 0≤β; γ≤1 ð6Þ
In (6) the revenue of firm i is given by (PiXi) and the
parameters β (beta) and γ (gamma) represent the weight put
on revenue and consumer surplus, respectively. This goal
function implies that both operators have identical goals and
that each operator is only concerned about the total surplus for
the passengers (S ).4 It is reasonable to focus on the consumer
surplus that both firms in total bring about since they serve the
same population. The restrictions placed on β and γ imply
that the firms cannot place lower weight on profits than on
revenues and passenger surplus. If β =γ =0, then the firms are
pure profit maximisers, and if β =γ =1 then they place equal
weight on profits, revenues and passenger surplus. If (β =0,
γ >0) and (β >0,γ =0) then the firms are only concerned about
profits and passenger surplus and profits and revenues, re-
spectively. In intermediate cases where β ,γ >0 , the firms put
weight on all three separate factors and the values of β and γ
depend on, as emphasized earlier, their ownership structure
and the power of their leadership.
There are few studies of which values these parameters can
take in practice. By combining fare schemes and information
on costs [3] was able to calculate that bus and ferry operators
in Norway weighted profit 38 % and 8 % higher than con-
sumer surplus, respectively. This would correspond to γ ≈0.72
for bus and γ ≈0.93 for ferry. The value of s was assessed by
[16] using the own and cross-price derivative. For example,
a s -value of 0.5 (−0.5) implies that ∂X 1∂P1 ¼ 1s2−1 ¼ −1:33 and
∂X 1
∂P2 ¼ − ss2−1 ¼ 0:67 −0:67ð Þ meaning that an increase in own
price by one unit will decrease own demand by 1.33 units and
increase (decrease) the rival’s demand by 0.67 units. The val-
uation of these parameters in a specific context could be re-
vealed by studying how prices deviate from profit maximiza-
tion in combination with a manager interview and an assess-
ment of the market conditions.
2.2 Stability and existence conditions
For later discussion it is useful to study whether the conditions
for which the interior equilibriums exist impose more restric-
tions on the parameters in question. Conditions for stability and
concavity for the cases of Cournot, Bertrand and collusion are
presented in Table 1. The stability condition implies that the
absolute value of the cross derivative of the response function
is less than 1; that is |∂X1/∂X2|, |∂X2/∂X1|<1. The concavity
condition implies that ∂2Gi/∂X2i<0. See e.g. [19] and [20] for
discussions of these conditions in oligopoly models.
From Table 1 it follows that the concavity conditions are
always met when 0<β ,γ <1. The stability conditions for the
case of Cournot and Bertrand when the firms place no weight
on revenues (β =0) and when they value profits and revenues
equally (β =1) are given as the areas under the lower enve-
lopes of the unbroken and broken curves in Fig. 1, respective-
ly. The curves show that the stability conditions are also met
under the previous restrictions placed on β and γ . Hence,
neither the concavity nor the stability conditions lead to more
bindings on β and γ .
2.3 Equilibrium prices for different competitive situations
2.3.1 Simultaneous price competition (Bertrand)
When the transport firms maximise their goal functions in (6)
by setting prices strategically, we obtain the following com-
mon equilibrium price (PB *) and quantity (XB *) 5:
PB ¼ 1−sð Þ γ−β−1ð Þ−c
γ 1−sð Þ þ s−2ð Þ 1þ βð Þ and X
B ¼ 1þ β−c
1þ sð Þ γ s−1ð Þ þ 2−sð Þ 1þ βð Þð Þ ð7Þ
5 It can be seen from (2) that when finding direct demand and inserting for
X2 in X1 then X 1 ¼ 1s2−1 sþ P1−sP2−1ð Þ . Inserting for X1 in G1 ¼
P1−cð ÞX 1 þ βP1X 1 þ γX
2
1þX 22þ2sX 1X 2
2 and solving for P1 yields the
response function P1 ¼ 12β−γþ2 c−sþ 1−sð Þ β−γð Þ þ sP2ð 1þ β−γð Þ þ
1Þ ¼ R1 P2ð Þ . Price in Eq. (7) is derived by inserting the symmetric
response function for firm 2 and the expression is equal for the two firms.
Inserting for P1 and P2 in the expression for X1 presented above produces
the equilibrium quantity given in (7). The same relationships form the basis
when deriving the equilibriums for Cournot in (13) and collusion in (19).
.
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3 This may be a reasonable assumption when operators using the same
modes compete; for example when two bus operators, two airlines etc.
compete. Their services can, however, still be different. These costs do
not consider the cost indivisibility often found in the transport industry,
but will be valid for the use of existing capacity or when capacity can be
made available on a short notice e.g. if resources can be allocated from
other parts of the firm.
4 Whether social surplus is maximized when maximizing Gi depends on
the values of β, γ and the shadow price of raising public funds. If the
shadow price is 20 %, as suggested by [3], and β=0 then the transport
operator must put 21 % higher weight on profit compared to consumer
surplus when aiming to maximize social welfare.
The bindings on β and γ leading to the stability conditions
in Fig. 1 being met ensure that both PB * and XB * are positive.
If the firms do not receive any subsidies, the conditions that
guarantee non-negative profits (π ≥0) imply that:
PB≥c→γ≤
c−1ð Þ s−1ð Þ þ β 1−s−2cþ csð Þ
c−1ð Þ s−1ð Þ ð8Þ
When the firms do not place any weight on revenues (β=0)
the condition under (8) implies that γ≤1. Hence, the firms must
value profits equal to or higher than consumer surplus. Increasing
β leads to tighter (looser) restrictions on γ in (8) when c>(<)(1−
s)/(2−s). A further inspection of the equilibrium prices gives:
∂PB
∂c
¼ 1
γ s−1ð Þ þ 2−sð Þ 1þ βð Þ > 0 ð9Þ
∂PB
∂s
¼ c−β−1ð Þ 1þ β−γ
2þ sγ þ 2β−s−γ−sβð Þ2 < 0 ð10Þ
∂PB
∂β
¼ γ 1−sð Þ þ c s−2ð Þ
2þ sγ þ 2β−s−γ−sβð Þ2 ≥ <ð Þ0 when
γ
c
≥ <ð Þ2−s
1−s
ð11Þ
∂PB
∂γ
¼ s−1ð Þ 1þ β−c
2þ sγ þ 2β−s−γ−sβð Þ2 < 0 ð12Þ
The denominator in (9) is positive with the previous re-
strictions placed on the parameters. Then higher costs lead to
higher prices. Moreover, increasing s leading to less comple-
mentary services when s <0 and more intense competition
when s >0 gives lower fares. The same happens when the
firms put more weight on consumer surplus (γ increases).
However, for all these unambiguous relationships the magni-
tudes depend on the values of γ , β and s . When the firms do
not care about consumer surplus (γ =0), it follows from (11)
that more weight placed on revenues (β increases) will reduce
prices. In intermediate cases (γ >0) it is ambiguous whether
more weight placed on revenues will increase prices with the
present restrictions imposed on the parameters. It is easily seen
from (11) that the lower the value of γ and the higher the
values of s and c , the more likely it is that higher β leads to
decreasing prices.
2.3.2 Simultaneous quantity competition (Cournot)
Under Cournot competition the transport firms maximise their
goal functions by choosing quantities. This gives the follow-
ing common equilibrium price (PC *) and quantity (XC *):
PC ¼ 1þ β þ 1þ sð Þ c−γð Þ
2þ sð Þ 1þ βð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þ and X
C ¼ 1þ β−c
2þ sð Þ 1þ βð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þ ð13Þ
Table 1 Conditions for symmet-
ric interior equilibrium Cournot Bertrand Collusion
Stability γ < min βþ1ð Þ sþ2ð Þ1þs ;
βþ1ð Þ s−2ð Þ
s−1
n o
γ < min βþ1ð Þ sþ2ð Þ1þs ;
βþ1ð Þ s−2ð Þ
s−1
n o
None
Concavity γ<2(β+1) γ<2(β+1) γ<2(β+1)
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
sComplements Substitutes
Fig. 1 Stability conditions for
Cournot and Bertrand
competition. The unbroken line
indicates β=0 and the broken line
indicates β=1. The dotted line
indicates the parameter restriction
γ=1
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Also, for this competitive situation, the stability conditions
in Table 1 and Fig. 1 ensure that both PC * and XC * are
positive. The condition for non-negative profits (π ≥0) when
not receiving subsidies is now:
PC≥c→γ≤
c−1ð Þ þ β 2cþ cs−1ð Þ

c−1ð Þ sþ 1ð Þ ð14Þ
When the firms do not place any weight on revenue (β =0),
the condition under (14) implies that γ ≤1/(s +1), meaning
that the firms will alwaysmake positive profits if they produce
complementary services (s <0). The more intensely the firms
compete (s >0 and increasing) the lower weight the firms can
put on consumer surplus if they want positive profits.When β
>0 and increases, the threshold weight the firms can put on
consumer surplus resulting in positive profits increases
(decreases) when c <(>)1/(2+s ).
The derivatives of the common equilibrium price with
respect to c ,s ,β and γ are now:
∂PC
∂c
¼ 1þ s
2þ sð Þ 1þ βð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þ > 0 ð15Þ
∂PC
∂s
¼ − 1þ βð Þ 1þ β−c
2þ sþ β 2þ sð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þð Þ2 < 0 ð16Þ
∂PC
∂β
¼ 1þ sð Þ γ 1þ sð Þ−c sþ 2ð Þ
2þ sþ β 2þ sð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þð Þ2 ≥ <ð Þ0 when
γ
c
≥ <ð Þ2þ s
1þ s
ð17Þ
∂PC
∂γ
¼ − 1þ sð Þ2 1þ β−c
2þ sþ β 2þ sð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þð Þ2 < 0 ð18Þ
Also under Cournot competition increasing s and
more weight put on consumer surplus (γ ) lead to lower
prices whilst increasing costs (c ) implies higher prices.
Another similar result compared to Bertrand competition
is that higher weight placed on revenues (β increases)
leads to lower prices when firms are not concerned
about consumer surplus (γ =0). Contrary to the Bertrand
case, more intense competition between the firms (s
increases) makes it less likely that prices decrease when
the firms put more weight on revenue, given that γ >0.
2.3.3 Collusion
When the firms collude, they maximise the total goal function
G =G 1+G 2. Equilibrium price (P
COLL *) and quantity
(XCOLL*) are now:
PCOLL ¼ 1þ cþ β−γ
2 1þ βð Þ−γ and X
COLL ¼ 1þ β−c
1þ sð Þ 2þ 2β−γð Þ
ð19Þ
The bindings previously imposed on the parameters in (19)
ensure that PCOLL* and XCOLL* are positive. The condition
for non-negative profit when not receiving subsidies (π ≥0) is
now:
PCOLL≥c→γ≤
1−cð Þ þ β 1−2cð ÞÞ
1−cð Þ ð20Þ
When the firms do not place any weight on revenues (β =
0), the condition under (20) is similar to the one under
Bertrand competition; i.e. the firms must value profits equally
or greater than consumer surplus (γ ≤1) in order to obtain
non-negative profits. Increasing β leads to tighter (looser)
restrictions on γ when c is greater (lower) than 0.5.
The derivatives of the common equilibrium price with
respect to c ,s ,β and γ are now:
∂PCOLL
∂c
¼ 1
2þ 2β−γ > 0 ð21Þ
∂PCOLL
∂s
¼ 0 ð22Þ
∂PCOLL
∂β
¼ γ−2c
2þ 2β−γð Þ2 ≥ <ð Þ0 when γ≥ <ð Þ2c ð23Þ
∂PCOLL
∂γ
¼ − 1þ β−c
2þ 2β−γð Þ2 < 0 ð24Þ
From Eqs. (21) through (24) it follows that the collusive
price increases in costs and decreases in the weight put on
consumer surplus. The more weight the firms put on consum-
er surplus (γ increases) and the lower the costs (c decreases)
the more likely it is that the collusive price increases when the
firms put more weight on revenues. Note that the equilibrium
price under collusion is independent of the degree of substi-
tutability or complementarity between the services (the s
value).
3 Comparisons of equilibrium prices
3.1 The collusion and the Bertrand cases
Using Eqs. (7) and (19) leads to the following difference,
denoted by Δ (delta), arising between the collusive and the
Bertrand cases:
Δ ¼ PCOLL−PB ¼ −s 1þ β−cð Þ
2þ 2β−γ
1þ β−γ
s 1þ β−γð Þ−2 1þ βð Þ
ð25Þ
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With the bindings we have imposed on the parame-
ters s ,β and γ it can be verified that the first denom-
inator in (25) is positive and the second is negative.
Consequently, Δ ≥(<)0 when s ≥ (<)0. No matter how
the firms value profit versus revenues and consumer
surplus, the collusive price will always be higher
(lower) than Bertrand prices when the firms produce
substitutable (complementary) services. Differentiating Δ in
(25) with respect to c ,s ,β and γ , we can deduce the following
based on some mathematical computations:
∂Δ
∂c ≥ <ð Þ0 when s ≤(>)0 , ∂Δ∂s > 0 , ∂Δ∂β ≥ <ð Þ0 when
s ≥(<)0, ∂Δ∂γ < 0 when s >0 and also when s <0 provided
that γ < q β; sð Þ ¼ 1þβ1−s 1−sþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−s
p 
, ∂Δ∂γ > 0 otherwise
All above differentiations can be proved exactly,
except the condition for the sign of ∂Δ /∂β when γ >
0 which according to simulation is the same as when
γ =0. Increasing cost will always decrease the differ-
ence between the collusive price and the Bertrand
prices irrespective of whether the firms produce com-
plementary or substitutable services. Increasing s de-
creases (increases) the difference between collusive
price and Bertrand prices when the firms produce
complementary (substitute) services. It can be noted
that for substitutes a larger value of s , in the meaning
of more positive, will increase the positive difference
in prices. Oppositely, for complementary services a
larger value of s means less negative and must be
understood as reducing the negative difference since
the Bertrand price in this case is higher than the price
in collusion.
The difference between the collusive price and
Bertrand prices will increase the more weight they
place on revenues (β increases). Provided that the
firms produce substitute services (s >0 ), the price rise
when Bertrand competitors start to collude will be
lower the more weight the firms place on consumer
surplus. When the operators produce complementary
services and at the same time place low emphasis on
travellers’ wellbeing and great weight on revenues
such that γ <q (β ,s ) an increase in γ can, however,
increase the price fall when the rivals start to collude.
3.2 The collusion and the Cournot cases
The difference between the collusive price and the Cournot
prices, denoted by θ (theta), is found by using Eqs. (13) and
(19). This leads to:
θ ¼ PCOLL−PC ¼ s 1þ βð Þ
2þ 2β−γ
1þ β−c
sþ 2ð Þ 1þ βð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þ
ð26Þ
Both denominators in (26) are always positive implying
that θ ≥(<)0 when s ≥(<)0. Irrespective of the firms’ cost
conditions and their valuation of profits versus revenues and
consumer surplus, prices will increase (decrease) when the
firms start to collude rather than compete and produce substi-
tute (complementary) services. After some mathematical cal-
culation we can derive the following using Eq. (26):
∂θ
∂c≥ <ð Þ0 when s ≤ (>)0 , ∂θ∂s > 0 , ∂θ∂β≥ <ð Þ0 when
s ≥(<)0 and γ =0, ∂θ∂β
>
< 0 when γ >0,
∂θ
∂γ≥ <ð Þ0 when s ≥(<)0
All above differentiations can be proved exactly, except the
condition for the sign of ∂θ /∂β when γ >0 which is found by
simulation. The difference in equilibrium prices for collusion
and Cournot will decrease with costs. Increasing s will reduce
(increase) the price difference when the firms start to collude
rather than compete and produce complementary (substitute)
services. Simulation indicates that the sign of ∂θ /∂β is am-
biguous when γ >0. Hence, we cannot conclude in which
direction more weight put on revenues (β increases) will
influence the difference between collusive and Cournot prices.
For the special case when the firms disregard consumer sur-
plus (γ =0) an increase in β will always lead to larger price
differences when they start to collude rather than compete.
Similarly, the more weight the firms place on consumer sur-
plus (γ increases), the greater is the price difference between
collusion and Cournot equilibriums, both when they produce
complementary and substitutable services.
3.3 The Bertrand and the Cournot cases
Using Eqs. (7) and (13) the difference between the Cournot
prices and Bertrand prices, denoted by Ψ (psi), can be calcu-
lated as follows:
Ψ ¼ PC−PB ¼ s c−1−βð Þ s 1þ βð Þ−γ 1þ sð Þ
s2 1þ β2 þ γ2 þ 2β−2γ−2βγ −4β β−γ þ 2ð Þ−γ2 þ 4 γ−1ð Þ ð27Þ
A closer inspection of the denominator in (27) shows that it
is negative. It thereby follows that Ψ >0 when s <0 and when
s >0 provided that s (1+β )−γ (1+s )>0=>γ <s (1+β )/(1+s ),
otherwise Ψ <0. This means that Cournot prices are higher
than Bertrand prices irrespective of the weight the firms put on
revenues and consumer surplus when the firms produce com-
plementary services (s <0). The sign of Ψ is ambiguous when
firms produce substitutable services (s >0). The conditions for
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prices in Cournot being higher than in Bertrand when the
firms place no weight on revenues (β =0) and when they
weight revenues and profits equally (β =1) are illustrated in
Fig. 2 by the lower envelopes of the unbroken and broken
lines, respectively. The lower weight the firms put on revenues
(decreasing β ), the greater weight they put on consumer
surplus (increasing γ ) and the less fiercely they compete
(decreasing s ), the more likely it is that Cournot prices are
lower than Bertrand prices. For example, if s =0.5 and β =0.6
then Ψ ≥(<)0 when γ ≤(>)0.53.
When differentiating Ψ in (27) with respect to c it
follows that Sign ∂Ψ∂c ¼ sign −Ψð Þ , meaning that an in-
crease in costs will always decrease the difference be-
tween the Cournot and the Bertrand prices. The condi-
tions for the signs of the derivatives of Ψ with respect
to s ,β and γ are all, however, very complicated when
β ,γ >0. The indicated signs below of these derivatives
when β ,γ >0 are, therefore, based on simulations. This
gives the following results:
∂Ψ
∂s < 0 when s < 0;
∂Ψ
∂s
>
< 0 when s >0,
∂Ψ
∂β > 0 when γ =0,
∂Ψ
∂β
>
< 0 when γ >0,
∂Ψ
∂γ ≥ <ð Þ0 when s ≤(>)0
When the firms produce complementary services, simula-
tions indicate that the difference between Cournot and
Bertrand prices is reduced when the degree of complementar-
ity between the services decreases. The relationship is incon-
clusive when the firms produce substitutes. In the special case
when the firms disregard consumer surplus (γ =0), increasing
β leads to a greater difference in prices between Cournot and
Bertrand, both when the firms produce complementary ser-
vices (s <0) and substitutes (s >0). When γ >0, the influence
on Ψ when β increases is ambiguous. Finally, the more
weight the firms put on consumer surplus (γ increases)
the greater is the difference between Cournot prices and
Bertrand prices when the firms produce complementary
services. When they produce substitutes it is, however,
ambiguous how more weight placed on consumer sur-
plus will influence Ψ .
3.4 Equal prices for different goal functions
Having the possibility of putting weight on several
goals, it is interesting to study further how they inter-
act with equilibrium prices. Hence, this section elabo-
rates more thoroughly on the relationships between the
weight put on consumer surplus (γ ) and revenues (β )
producing equal equilibrium prices for each of the
three studied competitive situations. Having in mind
that P j *=P j *(γ (β ),β ), implicit differentiation assuming
P j * being constant gives the expression in (28).
∂γ
∂β
 
j
¼ −
∂Pj
∂β
∂Pj
∂γ
where j ¼ B;C;COLLf g ð28Þ
From earlier analyses we have found that ∂Pj */∂γ <0. It
then follows from (28) that Sign (∂γ /∂β )j=Sign∂Pj */∂β . If
Fig. 2 Conditions for Cournot prices being higher than Bertrand prices for different levels of competition
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equilibrium prices increase (decrease) when the firms put
more weight on revenues, then the weight the firms put on
consumer surplus must also increase (decrease) if the prices
are to remain constant.
Inserting (11) and (12) in (28) gives for the Bertrand case:
∂γ
∂β
 
B
¼ γ þ cs−2c−sγ
1−sð Þ 1þ β−cð Þ≥ <ð Þ0 when
γ
c
≥ <ð Þ2−s
1−s
;
∂2γ
∂β2
 
B
¼ 0
ð29Þ
Similarly, using Eqs. (17) and (18) in combination with
(28) gives for the Cournot case:
∂γ
∂β
 
C
¼ γ−2cþ sγ−cs
1þ sð Þ 1þ β−cð Þ≥ <ð Þ0 when
γ
c
≥ <ð Þ2þ s
1þ s;
∂2γ
∂β2
 
C
¼ 0
ð30Þ
Finally, we can deduce for the collusion case, using
Eqs. (23), (24) and (28):
∂γ
∂β
 
COLL
¼ γ−2c
1þ β−c≥ <ð Þ0 when γ≥ <ð Þ2c;
∂2γ
∂β2
 
COLL
¼ 0 ð31Þ
It follows from (29), (30) and (31) that the relationships
between γ and β giving constant prices are linear for all
competitive situations.The conditions for the signs of
(∂γ /∂β )B, (∂γ /∂β )C and (∂γ /∂β )COLL in (29), (30) and (31)
are exactly the same as the conditions for the signs of ∂PB */
∂β , ∂PC */∂β and ∂PCOLL*/∂β in Eqs. (11), (17) and (23),
respectively. The signs of (∂γ /∂β )j are independent of the
weight the firms put on revenues (β ), but depend on s ,γ
and c as illustrated in Fig. 3. The areas above the unbroken,
broken and dotted curves indicate that the weight put on
consumer surplus must be increased to maintain the same
equilibrium price under Bertrand, Cournot and Collusion,
respectively, when greater weight is placed on revenues.
Since (2−s )/(1−s ),(2+s )/(2−s )>1 it follows that γ >c if
(∂γ /∂β )j>0. For all competitive situations Fig. 3 also shows
that it is more likely that γ will increase with β , the more
weight the firms initially place on consumer surplus and the
lower their costs (c ) are. Moreover, it is more (less) likely that
(∂γ /∂β )B>0 than (∂γ /∂β )C>0 when the firms produce
complementary (substitutable) services. As expected, the de-
gree of complementarity or substitutability between the ser-
vices (the value of s ) does not influence the relationship
between γ and β when the firms collude.
Suppose, for example, that γ =β =c =s =0.5 meaning that
the firms produce substitutable services and initially put twice
as much weight on profits than on revenues and consumer
surplus. It then follows from (29), (30) and (31) above that
(∂γ /∂β )B=−1.0, (∂γ /∂β )C=−0.33 and (∂γ /∂β )COLL=−0.5 .
If equilibrium prices are to remain constant when the firms put
more weight on revenues, the weight they put on consumer
surplus must decrease most when they compete in prices and
least when they compete in quantities.
3.5 Model results – Discussion
Regardless of the weight the firms put on profits, revenues and
consumer surplus decreasing cost (c decreases) and greater
weight put on consumer surplus (γ increases) will reduce
equilibrium prices,P*, under all types of competition between
the operators. Moreover, when the degree of complementarity
4
Bertrand
c
3
( / )B,COLL> 0( / )C< 0
( / )B,C,COLL> 0 ( / )C,COLL> 0( / )B < 0
( / )B,C,COLL> 0
Collusion
2( / )B > 0( / )C,COLL< 0
( / )C> 0( / )B,COLL< 0
1
Cournot
( / ) < 0 ( / ) < 0B,C,COLL B,C,COLL
0
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
sComplements Substitutes
Fig. 3 Conditions for equal price
when changing the weight put on
consumer surplus and revenues
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between the services decreases or the degree of substitutability
between them increases (increasing absolute value of s ),
equilibrium prices under Bertrand and Cournot competition
will decrease whilst the collusive price is independent of s .
The influence on prices of more weight put on revenue
(increasing β) is, however, not so clear-cut. For all types of
competition the sign of the derivative of price with respect to
the weight put on revenue critically depends on the firms’ costs
(c), the weight they put on consumer surplus (γ) and how
fiercely they compete (s). When the firms place no weight on
consumer surplus (γ =0), an increase in β always leads to lower
prices. In intermediate cases we can, in general, conclude that a
necessary condition for increasing equilibrium prices with β is
that γ >c . Themoreweight the firms place on consumer surplus
(γ) and the lower their costs (c) are, the more likely it is that
equilibrium prices increase with β . Lower degree of comple-
mentarity or higher degree of substitutability between the ser-
vices (increasing s ) makes it less (more) likely that prices
increase with β under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. A closer
inspection of the relevant derivatives also shows that it is less
likely that an increase in β leads to higher equilibrium prices
when the firms compete in prices than when they compete in
quantities and produce substitutable (complementary) services.
Finally, when the firms collude, more weight placed on reve-
nues will increase prices when γ >2c .
When the firms produce substitutable (complementary)
services, the collusive price is always higher (lower) than
prices in the competitive situations. Moreover, when the firms
produce complementary services (s <0), Cournot prices are
higher than Bertrand prices irrespective of the weights the
firms put on revenues and consumer surplus. Also when the
firms produce substitutes (s >0) and are not concerned about
consumer surplus (γ =0), the usual result arises that Bertrand
prices are lowest regardless of the weight the firms place on
revenues. However, when the firms place sufficiently great
weight on consumer surplus (γ is large), rather low weight on
revenues (β is low) and compete to a moderate degree (s is
positive but low), it is demonstrated that Bertrand prices can
reach a higher level than Cournot prices.
The magnitudes of the differences between all equilibrium
prices will decrease when the firms’ costs (c ) increase. The
difference between the collusive price on the one hand and
Bertrand and Cournot prices on the other hand is reduced with
a lower degree of complementarity and increased with a
higher degree of substitutability between the services (s in-
creases). Also, an increase in s makes the Cournot prices
lower than Bertrand prices when the firms produce comple-
mentary services. It is, however, ambiguous how a higher
degree of substitutability between the services will influence
the difference between Bertrand and Cournot prices.
If firms are not concerned about consumer surplus (γ =0),
more weight placed on revenues (β increases) will always
increase the difference between all equilibrium prices. When
the firms also place weight on consumer surplus (γ >0) in-
creasing β reduces (increases) the difference between the
prices in collusion and Cournot when the firms produce
complements (substitutes). The influence on the other differ-
ences when the firms put more weight on revenues is ambig-
uous. The difference between the collusive price and Cournot
prices will always increase when the firms put more weight on
consumer surplus (γ increases). As far as the difference be-
tween the collusive price and Bertrand prices is concerned, it
decreases when the firms put more weight on consumer
surplus and produce substitutable services (s >0). When s <
0, the influence of a greater γ is ambiguous. The difference
between Cournot prices and Bertrand prices also decrease
when the firms produce complementary services and become
more concerned about consumer surplus. Otherwise; that is
when s >0, the influence of higher γ depends on the magni-
tudes of s ,β and γ .
The relationships between the weights the firms place on
consumer surplus (γ ) and revenues (β ) giving the same
equilibrium prices are linear for all competitive situations
and increase (decrease) when prices increase (decrease) with
β . A necessary but not sufficient condition for ∂γ /∂β >0 is
that γ >c . Hence the more weight the firms initially place on
consumer surplus and the lower their costs are, the more likely
it is that increasing β must result in a greater γ , providing that
equilibrium prices remain constant.
4 Conclusions and implications
The paper addresses a transport market with two firms that have
identical cost functions, produce symmetrically differentiable
transport services and compete either simultaneously in prices
(Bertrand), in quantities (Cournot) or collude. The degree of
competition between the firms is indicated by a variable (s)
measuring the degree of complementarity. The firms have equal
goal functions that extend beyond profit maximisation; we
assume they maximise a weighted sum of profits (π), revenues
(PX) and consumer surplus (S). Such a goal function is relevant
for firms operating in the passenger transport industry due to the
presence of state ownership, local public stakeholders such as
municipalities and counties, and the separate interests of owners
and management. The analysis is based on a theoretical model
from existing literature [4] and now extended by including
revenues of the firm in the goal function.
Generally, most of the well known results arising in a
market where firms maximize profit are also valid when
considering that firms have extended, and possibly more
realistic, goal functions. This information has value in itself;
it demonstrates how weights put on different goals and the
competitive situation influence the interrelationships between
the variables. The findings presented in this paper provide
regulators of the market for public passenger transport with an
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understanding of how companies act under different regula-
tory regimes - depending on their goals and costs. This knowl-
edge can help regulators aiming to meet politically decided
objectives through regulation.
Firstly, if regulators are purely concerned about travellers’
welfare, they should encourage the use of publicly
owned transport companies, as they normally weigh
consumer surplus more greatly (higher γ ) than private-
ly owned firms. This would give lower prices and will
benefit travellers, but it is uncertain to which degree it
benefits the society. It depends on the cost of rising
public funds (see footnote 4). Also greater weight
placed on revenues (increasing β ) will probably lead
to lower prices when the firms place low weight on
consumer surplus (γ is low). Hence, the travellers’ will
benefit from powerful management with goals extending
beyond pure profit maximization (β >0) in privately
owned firms when γ is low.
Secondly, the decision-makers should endorse (oppose)
that the firms start to collude if they produce complementary
(substitutable) services. The difference between the collusive
price on the one hand and Bertrand and Cournot prices on the
other hand is reduced with a lower degree of complementarity
and increased with a higher degree of substitutability between
the services. In intermediate cases, i.e. when the firms produce
complementary services for some customers and substitutable
services for others, the regulators’ view regarding collusion
should depend on the weight they put on welfare provided for
the different groups of customers. Economies (diseconomies)
of scale also point in the direction that collusion becomes
more (less) favourable.
Thirdly, since decreasing costs (c ) make greater difference
between the collusive price on the one hand and Cournot and
Bertrand prices on the other hand, decision-makers should be
more concerned about the firms’ competitive situation when
they become more productive. These effects are strengthened
the greater the degree of substitutability or complementarity
between the services.
Finally, it is discussed how the equilibrium price depends
on the goal functions in the collusive case. How the weight the
firms put on profits, revenues and consumer surplus influ-
ences the magnitude of price changes is not so clear-cut. One
unambiguous result is, however, that when the firms are
purely concerned about profits and revenues (γ =0), greater
weight put on revenues leads tomore significant price changes
when the firms start to collude and when they start to compete
in quantities rather than prices and vice-versa. This points in
the direction that regulators should give special attention to the
competitive situation for privately owned firms (where γ =0)
with rather powerful management (high β ).
From a travellers’ point of view the regulators should in
general stimulate the firms to compete with regard to price
rather than quantity since Bertrand prices are lower than
Cournot prices in most cases. Only when the firms produce
substitutable services to a moderate degree, place great weight
on consumer surplus and low weight on revenues, do we get
the unusual result that the travellers may be better off when the
firms compete in quantity rather than in prices. Since the
difference between prices in Cournot and Bertrand increases
the more productive the firms are, the regulators should pay
greater attention to how the firms compete when they think the
firms’ productivity will increase. Also, a higher degree of
complementarity between the firms’ services should lead to
the regulators being more concerned about whether the firms
compete in quantity or prices.
Finally, it should be emphasised that more powerful man-
agement leading to greater weight being placed on revenue
may result in higher prices in transport firms with substantial
public ownership. A further development of this model could
incorporate how asymmetry in costs and goal functions would
influence the properties of equilibrium prices.
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